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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifFAppellee

Case No. 20020247-CA

vs.
DAVID LEE PATRICK,
Defendant/Appellant

Priority
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction of Possession of a Prohibited Item in a
Correctional Facility, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-311.3.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3 (e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, when it ruled that subsection 76-8311.3 (2) and (4)(c) under which defendant was convicted, were to be read
independently of one another?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: " Because the answer is purely a matter of
statutory construction, we review the trial court's decision for correctness." Salt
Lake City v. Emerson. 861 P.2d 443,445 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 25,2001, the defendant was charged with Transportation or
Possession of Items Prohibited in Correctional and Mental Health Facilities, in
violation of Section 76-8-311.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1999. The defendant was
convicted of this offense, following a bench trial on December 12,2001.
The statute under which defendant was convicted, states under subsection 768-311.3:
"Notwithstanding section 76-10-500, a correctional or mental health facility
may provide by rule that no firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, implement of
escape, explosive, controlled substance, spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine, or
poison in any quantity may be: (a) transported to or upon a correctional or mental
health facility; (b) sold or given away at any correctional or mental health facility;
(c) given to or used by any offender at a correctional or mental health facility; or (d)
knowingly or intentionally possessed at a correctional or mental health facility."
Subsection 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) of the same statute states:
" Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility, or any detainee who
2

possesses at a secure area of a mental health facility, any firearm, ammunition,
dangerous weapon, or implement of escape is guilty of a second degree felony."
Trial counsel for the defendant, argued before the trial judge that subsection
(2) of this statute, was a pre-requisite for a conviction under subsection (4) (c) of the
same statute. In other words, trial counsel argued that if the correctional facility or
mental health facility has not promulgated rules prohibiting the possession of
dangerous weapons in their facility under subsection (2), the State is not entitled to a
conviction under subsection (4) (c). Trial counsel argued that the State did not show
that the Cache County jail had written rules prohibiting the introduction of
dangerous weapons into their facility and was therefore, not entitled to a conviction.
The Honorable Clint S. Judkins, denied the motion to dismiss, stating "I'm
going to overrule your motion to dismiss. I think what that pertains to, which
you've referred to, is to anyone else except an offender. If you will note, under
(4)(c) that refers to an offender. The offender is defined as someone detained in the
facility.
What you are referring to is someone like myself who went over there and
had a weapon, then it would apply to what you're referring to in that section, that
they would have to have a policy. So I'm going to deny your motion at this time."
R. 77 at 119.
3

Ultimately, the trial court held that the comb with razor blades attached was a
dangerous weapon as defined and found the defendant guilty of possessing a
dangerous weapon in a correctional facility, a second degree felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant argues that subsection 76-8-311.3 (2) of the statute under
which he was convicted, requires a correctional or mental health facility to provide
by rule that firearms or other dangerous weapons are prohibited within their
facilities. Defendant further argues that if a correctional facility fails to provide by
rule that dangerous weapons are prohibited, the State is not entitled to a conviction
under subsection 78-8-311.1 (4) (c). Defendant reasons that if the Court does not
interpret subsection 2 in that way, subsection 2 has no meaning and is merely
surplusage. However, in reviewing the statutory sections, counsel for the appellant
does not find that the issue is meritorious and requests permission to withdraw as
counsel for the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
Defendant was charged, by information, with violating U.C.A 76-8-311.3 (4)
(c) as follows:
"That DAVID LEE PATRICK on or about 9/20/2001, as an offender or
detainee, did possess at a correctional facility, or at a secure area of a mental health
facility, any firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, or implement of escape to wit:

razor blades."
Defendant argues that section 76-8-311.3 (2) of the statute under which he
was convicted, requires a correctional or mental health facility to provide by rule
thatfirearmsor other dangerous weapons are prohibited within their facilities.
Defendant further argues that if a correctional facility fails to provide by rule that
dangerous weapons are prohibited, the State is not entitled to a conviction under 768-311.1 (4) (c). Defendant reasons that if the Court does not interpret subsection 2
in that way, subsection 2 has no meaning and is merely surplusage:
"Bluffs interpretation of section 76-5-208 would render portions of the
statute redundant, superfluous, and inoperable, and therefore is impermissible under
the plain language rule." State v. Bluff, 2000 UT 66
"In analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of
the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its
terms. However, if wefinda provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its
application, we must analyze the act in it entirety and harmonize its provisions in
accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. Nevertheless, a statute's
unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. State
v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,4 P.3d 795 (internal quotations omitted)" State v. Bluff,
2002 UT 66.
5

In addition to harmonizing all of the provisions of a single statute, the court
must also harmonize the statute with other relevant statutes. See State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439,468 (Utah 1988) (stating "statutes must be interpreted harmoniously
with other statues relevant to the subject matter.")
Because section 76-8-311.3 (2) refers to section 76-10-500, the provisions of
that statute should also be harmonized with the provisions of section 76-8-311.3 (2).
76-8-311.3 (2) states:
"(2) Notwithstanding Section 76-10-500, a correctional or mental health
facility may provide by rule that no firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon,
implement of escape, explosive, controlled substance, spiritous or fermented liquor,
medicine or poison in any quantity may be :
(a) transported to or upon a correctional or mental health facility;
(b) sold or given away at any correctional or mental health facility,
(c) given to or used by any offender at a correctional or mental health facility;
or
(d) knowingly or intentionally possessed at a correctional or mental health
facility.
76-10-500, states:
Uniform law.
" The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally protected

right, the Legislaturefindsthe need to provide uniform laws throughout the state.
Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the Untied States or a
lawfully admitted alien shall not be:
(a) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, selling, transferring,
transporting, or keeping anyfirearmat his place of residence, property, business or
in any vehicle lawfully in his possession or lawfully under his control; or
(b) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess, transport,
or keep a firearm.
(2) "This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its
political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulatefirearmsshall be
reserved to the state except where the Legislature specifically delegates
responsibility to local authorities or state entities. Unless specifically authorized by
the Legislature by statute, a local authority or state entity may not enact or enforce
any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms."
A plain reading of section 76-8-311.3. (2) is that notwithstanding the
Legislature's exclusive right to restrict the possession of firearms, they are
specifically granting to correctional and secure mental health facilities the authority
to restrict the possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons within their
facilities. Without this grant of authority, correctional and secure mental health
7

facilities would be prohibitedfromrestricting the possession of firearms because
section 76-10-500 (2), states that the Legislature must specifically giant such
authority to state entities:
"Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority
or state entity may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining
to firearms."
Further, it does not appear to counsel for the appellant that the Legislature
intended to make section 78-8-311(2) a prerequisite for conviction of an offender
under (4) c, as each subsection of 76-8-311.3 (4), specifies whether the subsection
applies to "any person" or to an "offender":
78-8-311.3 (4): (emphasis added)
(a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional facility, or into a
secure area of a mental health facility, any firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon,
or implement of escape with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is guilty of a
second degree felony.
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any offender at a correctional
facility, or any detainee at a secure area of a mental health facility, any firearm,
ammunition, dangerous weapon, or implement of escape is guilty of a second degree
felony.
8

(c) Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility, or any detainee
who possesses at a secure area of a mental health facility, anyfirearm,ammunition,
dangerous weapon, or implement of escape is guilty of a second degree felony.
(d) Any person, who, without the permission of the authority operating the
correctional facility or the secure area of a mental health facility, knowingly
possesses at a correctional facility or a secure area any firearm, ammunition,
dangerous weapon, or implement of escape is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person violates Section 76-10-306 who knowingly or intentionally
transports, possesses, distributes, or sells any explosive in a correctional facility or
mental health facility."
A "fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that a statute 'be
looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be
accomplished.'" State . Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224,1227 (Utah App. 1995)
A distinction is made between "any person" and an "offender" in all of the
subsections 76-8-311.3. It is clear that the legislature is attempting to prohibit
anyone confined in a correctional or secure mental health facihtyfrompossessing or
obtaining a dangerous weapon or other implement of escape. The provisions of 768-311.3 (2) appear to apply to persons other than an offender who work at or are
visitors to a correctional or mental health facility. If the Court found that subsection
9

(2) applied to offenders, one can envision a scenario wherein a correctional or
secure mental health facility failed to promulgate rules prohibiting the possession of
dangerous weapons at its facility and offenders and detainees thereby freely
possessed such implements. "(W)e interpret a statute to avoid absurd
consequences." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,992 P.2d 986 (1999).
Additionally, the record reflects that the Cache County jail did promulgate
rules prohibiting dangerous weapons within their facilities. The following
colloquies took place during trial regarding the promulgation of rules prohibiting
weapons at the Cache County jail:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
BY MR. HULT:
Q. Mr. Astle, you testified earlier, did you not, that there are a couple of
signs at the entries to the jail, one being the sallyport door where all prisoners would
go through when they first enter the jail?
A. Yes, that's correct.
"Any officers that come into the jail, any law enforcement officers, are not
permitted to have guns in the jail but have to check them at a box at the entry?
A. That's correct.
Q. And that's the policy that you're talking about?
10

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And to your knowledge that's the extent of that policy?
A. As far as? I'm sorry, you'll have to rephrase.
Q. As far as weapons in the jail?
A. Our jail has an absolutely no weapons within the jail secured area. So
once you come through the secured doors you can have no weapons at all.
Q. Okay. Is that a written policy?
A. It's in, I believe, our jail policies and procedures. It is also posted on all
of the doors.
Q. Okay. Where are those doors?
A. Umm, the doors coming in. There's one in the garage also. There's one
as you come into the booking area.
Q. And are those in the inmate area?
A. Umm,. Only when they're first arrested; otherwise they never see that part
of the jail. R. 77 at 97 and 98.
The following testimony was also received:
Q. Mr. Astle, you testified earlier, did you not, that there are couple of signs
at entries to the jail, one being the sallyport where all prisoners would go through
when they first enter the jail?
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A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And the sign wouldn't be posted where there would be daily access to it
by the prisoners, would there?
A. Umn, as far as?
Q. As far as being able to read it or see it?
A. It's only at the jail main doors when you first come into the jail. It's not
in the housing areas.
Q. Okay. I understand that you do not - would like to return this to the jail
so you'd rather that we not mark it as an exhibit?
A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you would be willing to read for the record what the sign
says?
A. Okay. "Before entering the jail please secure allfirearms,ammunition,
knives, sprays and batons."
Q. Okay. Is there anything else on that?
A. It also states that all prisoners must be handcuffed, no exceptions.
MR. HULT: Thank you. That's all I have for this witness,
THE COURT: Mr. Linton?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
12

BY MR. LINTON:
Q. You're also familiar with the inmate manual?
A. lam.
Q. I'm going to show you what has been marked as state's exhibit eight.
That is a photocopy and do you recognize what it is a photocopy of?
A. Yes. It is our contraband section ofthe inmate manual which is supplied
to every inmate.
Q. They actually are given one of those?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. To keep?
A. To keep as long as they stay with us. It is returned to us when they are
released from our custody.
Q. Can any inmate get in the jail without a copy of that?
A. Nobody is housed without a copy of this manual.
Q. And you are sure that that is the inmate manual that you are familiar with?
A. Yes
MR. LINTON: I'd ask for state's exhibit eight to be entered into evidence,
Your Honor.
MR. HULT: No. Objection
13

THE COURT: It will be received.
Q. (BY MR. LINTON): At this time would you read Section 14,
contraband, or would you prefer that I read it? R. 77 at 137,138,139 and 140.
The section of the manual which was received into evidence states as follows:
"SECTION 14: CONTRABAND
14.1 Contraband is defined as any property or object which has not been
provided or approved for your possession or use or any item which
has been altered, or misused in any way, or used in any manner other
than that for which it was originally manufactured. CONTRABAND
IS PROHIBITED
14.2 If you are found to be in possession of contraband, you will be subject
to disciplinary action and/or criminal prosecution. All contraband will
be confiscated and either placed in evidence or disposed of in a legally
accepted manner.
14.3 Introduction of contraband into the jail is a felony." R. at 75, State's
Exhibit 8
Although the State did not introduce evidence of written policies and
proceduresfromthe jail manual, evidence was introduced to indicate that the jail
prohibited the introduction of weapons into their facility. Accordingly, even if the
14

Court found that subsection 76-8-311.1 (2) was a precondition for conviction under
(4) (c), the defendant's argument would fail, as the evidence indicates that the jail
exercised the authority to create rules granted to them under 76-8-311.1 (2).

CONCLUSION
Counsel for the appellant has reviewed the record and found no error or
issues which would warrant appellate review and requests permission to withdraw
as counsel for the appellant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of November, 2002

Barbara King Lachmar
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on the 25th day of September, 2002,1 caused to be
mailed first class, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to:
DAVID PATRICK
Utah State Prison
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
I further certify that, on the 29th day of November, 2002,1 caused to be
mailed first class, postage prepaid, two true and exact copies of the ANDERS
BRIEF OF APPELLANT and the CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL RE: ANDERS
BRIEF REQUIREMENT to:
LAURA B. DUPAIX g^i.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Barbara King Lachmar

ADDENDUM

FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011100662 FS

DAVID LEE PATRICK,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

CLINT S. JUDKINS
March 21, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindac
Prosecutor: LINTON, DONALD G.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HULT, NATHAN D
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 26, 1978
Video
CHARGES
1. ITEMS PROH IN CORRECTIONAL/HEALTH FAC - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/12/2001 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ITEMS PROH IN
CORRECTIONAL/HEALTH FAC a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Credit is granted for 66 day(s) previously served.
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Case No: 011100662
Date:
Mar 21, 2002
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$5000.00
$0.00
$2297.30
$5000.00
$5000.00
$0
$2297.30
$5000.00
Plus Interest

Dated this *2."3L day of

JUDKINS
Court Judge

Pacre 2 (last)

Barbara King Lachmar (5985)
Post Office Box 4432
Logan, Utah 84323-4432
(435) 755-7694
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlainuW Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL RE:
COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS
BRIEF REQUIREMENT

vs.
DAVID LEE PATRICK,
Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20020247 - CA

Comes now Barbara King Lachmar, attorney for the Appellant and hereby
certifies to the following:
On September 23,2002, counsel for the Appellant requested an extension of
time in which to file the Anders brief of the Appellant, in order to provide the
Appellant with the opportunity to review the brief, prior tofiling,so that he could
raise any issues he wished and communicate those concerns to his attorney. (See
Motion for Enlargement of Time in Which tofileBrief of Appellant attached as
Exhibit 1) On September 25,2002, counsel for the appellant was granted an
extension. (See Order attached as Exhibit 2) On September 25,2002, counsel for
the Appellant mailed a copy of the Anders brief to the Appellant, with a letter,

requesting that the Appellant review the brief and raise any additional issues which
he felt should be reviewed on appeal. (See copy of certificate of mailing and letter
to client attached as Exhibit 3) Counsel for the Appellant received no response from
the Appellant, who is currently house at the Utah State Prison. Accordingly, on
October 22, 2002, counsel for the Appellantfiledthe Anders brief with no revisions
and mailed a second copy of the brief to the Appellant. On October 31,2002, the
Anders briefs were returned to counsel for the Appellant, stating that she had not
allowed her client ample opportunity to respond to the brief prior to filing. As
counsel for the Appellant had sent a copy of the Anders brief to the Appellant on
September 25, 2002, with a letter requesting that the Appellant contact her
regarding any additional issues and had sent a second copy of the brief to the
Appellant on October 22, 2002, counsel for the Appellant did not re-mail the brief
to the Appellant. As of November 29,2002, counsel for the Appellant has received
no responsefromthe Appellant. Accordingly, counsel for the Appellant is re-filing
the Anders brief, with this certificate of counsel as requested by the Court.
Dated this 29th day of November, 2002

Barbara King Lachmar
Attorney for Appellant

Barbara King Lachmar (5985)
Post Office Box 4432
Logan, Utah 84323-4432
(435)755-7694
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

DAVID LEE PATRICK,
Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20020247 - CA

Comes now the Appellant, by and through his attorney, Barbara King
Lachmar, and hereby moves this Court for thirty additional days in which to file the
brief of Appellant. This motion is based on the following:
In analyzing the issues for appeal and preparing the brief herein, it became
apparent that counsel for the appellant would need to file and Anders-type brief In
reviewing the requirements for filing such a brief, counsel for the appellant learned
that the defendant must be provided an opportunity to review the brief, prior to
filing, so that he may raise any issues he wishes to and communicate those concerns
to his attorney. Counsel for the appellant wishes to give the defendant thirty days in
which to review and provide input to the brief, as the defendant/appellant is

currently housed at the Utah State Pnson and will need adequate time to respond to
the brief

Further, counsel for the appellant will require adequate time to review

those concerns and include them in the brief, if they appear to be meritorious
appellate claims.
The appellant's brief is currently due on September 23, 2002. Counsel for
the appellant has previously received one thirty and one fourteen day extension for
filing of appellant's brief.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested that appellant be given until October
23, 2002 to file appellant's brief, in order to comply with the Anders requirement to
provide review time to the appellant .
Dated this 23rd day of September, 2002

Barbara King Lachmar
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Extend Time
was faxed and mailed First class, postage prepaid, to the Utah Attorney General. 160
East 300 South, Sixth Floor Post Office Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd
day of September, 2002.

^£>i^/t///ul^
Barbara King Lachmar

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 5 2002
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
c :a k

' * °r ir's Cour^

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff a n d A p p e l l e e ,

ORDER
Case N o . 20020247-CA

v.
D a v i d Lee Patrick,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t

This m a t t e r is b e f o r e t h e court u p o n appellant's m o t i o n ,
filed September 23, 2002, f o r a further thirty-day e x t e n s i o n of
time to file a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f .
T h e court notes that a p p e l l a n t h a s received t w o p r i o r
extensions of time, o n e 3 0 - d a y e x t e n s i o n u n d e r Rule 2 6 ( a ) , a n d
one 15-day e x t e n s i o n u n d e r R u l e 22(b) of t h e U t a h R u l e s of
Appellate Procedure.
The court is n o t i n c l i n e d to g r a n t e x t e n s i o n requests w h i c h
extend t h e d u e date f o r a b r i e f m o r e than 6 0 days b e y o n d t h e
original due date. However, in an effort to expedite this
matter, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is granted an
extension of time to October 23, 2002, to file appellant's brief,
Dated this JZ? day of September, 2002.
FOR THE COURT:

*kWa£' It). %&~/~
Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 26, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
BARBARA KING LACHMAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
895 N 200 W
LOGAN UT 84321
Dated this September 26, 2002.

BY

-/-fjJA /Y?JUM

Deputy Cie^rk

/

Case No. 20020247

^

BARBARA KING LACHMAR
Attorney at L*aw

Post Offi ce Box
Logan, Utak 8 4 3 2 5 - 4 4 3 2
(455) 7 5 5 - 7 6 9 4

September 25, 2002
David Patrick
Post Office Box 4432
Draper, Utah 84020
Re: Appeal
Dear David,
My name is Barbara Lachmar and I have been appointed to represent you on your
appeal from possession of a prohibited item in a correctional facility. In reviewing
your case and possible issues to raise on your behalf, I have come to the unfortunate
conclusion that there are no appealable issues available to you. I have drafted a
brief to that effect and am enclosing it for your review. Because I am requesting
permission to withdraw, based on the lack of appealable issues, you have the
opportunity to review this brief before I file it. Please review the enclosed
materials and let me know if you can see any issues which could be legitimately
raised with the Utah Court of Appeals. If you find something, please notify me no
later that October 10, 2002, so that I can research and include those issues in this
brief
If you do not see any issues which you would like me to raise, I will file the brief the
way it is and request permission to withdraw. If you have questions, please feel free
to write to me at the address above. Your brief is currently due on October 23,
2002, so any new issues must be briefed and included prior to that time.
I reviewed the factual issues in your case and realize you argued that the comb and
razors did not constitute a dangerous weapon. In order to challenge the trial court's
factual findings in the case, I must outline for the appellate court all of the facts
which support the trial court's decision. If the facts provide reasonable support for

the trial court's decision, there is no basis for a reversal on appeal.
I'm sorry that I was not able to find any appealable issues in your case. Please let
me know immediately if there are issues which I may have overlooked.
Sincerely,

Barbara King Lachmar

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on the <x5~ day of September, 2002,1 caused to be
mailed first class, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to:
DAVID PATRICK
Utah State Prison
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
I further certify that, on the
day of October, 2002,1 caused to be
mailed first class, postage prepaid, two true and exact copies of BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, to:
LAURA B.DUPAIX
Assistant Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Paiitetta Stagg
Cleric of the Court

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER STRIKING BRIEF
Case No. 20020247-CA

v.
David Lee Patrick,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
This case is before the court on a brief filed pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) and
State v. Clayton, 6,39 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1981) . This court has very
clearly explained the procedures required to file an Anders
brief. See State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 304, 13 P.3d 1056. One
of the most important points has consistently been that an
appellant must be afforded the assistance of counsel until this
court makes the independent determination that the appeal is
wholly frivolous. See id. at 1l0. This "requires counsel, not
an appellant, to brief any issues raised by an appellant." Id.
In order to demonstrate that this procedure has been
accomplished, counsel must properly certify to this court that a
copy of the brief was furnished to the client in enough time to
allow the client to raise any additional points and to have them
included in the brief. See id. at 1|4. If, after its own
independent review of the record, the court determines that the
appeal is wholly frivolous, the court may proceed to affirm the
decision below and then grant counsel's request to withdraw. See
id.; see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) ("[0]nly
after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal
may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits
without the assistance of counsel.").
In this case, the Anders brief was served on Appellant, by
mail, after it was filed in this court. This procedure does not
comply with the Anders requirements and was disapproved in Wells.
See Wells at KlO. Based upon the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the proposed Anders brief is
stricken, and within thirty days of the date hereof, counsel
shall file a substitute brief including counsel's certification
that a copy has been served upon Appellant in enough time to
allow a response and that counsel has incorporated any points
raised by Appellant. In the alternative, counsel may file a
regular appellate brief in this case within the same time period.

A ruling on counsel's motion to withdraw is deferred pending
filing of a substitute brief in compliance with this order.
DATED this 31

day of October, 2002.

FOR THE COURT:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
BARBARA KING LACHMAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
895 N 200 W
LOGAN UT 84 321
Dated this October*31, 2002.

By/^-/#7Vo/~
mZtf Clerk
No. 20020247ACA

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on November 29, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL RE: COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS BRIEF
REQUIREMENT was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

DAVID PATRICK
Utah State Prison
Post Office Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

Barbara King Lachmar

